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Abstract 
This study attempts to analyze changing patterns of land transfers and schooling 
investments by gender over three generations in customary land areas of Ghana￿s 
Western Region.  Although traditional matrilineal inheritance rules deny landownership 
rights to women, women have increasingly acquired land through gifts and other means, 
thereby reducing the gender gap in landownership.  The gender gap in schooling has also 
declined significantly, though it persists.  We attribute such changes to the increase in 
women￿s bargaining power due to an agricultural technology that increased the demand 
for women￿s labor, contributing to the reduction of ￿social￿ discrimination as well as 
weak ￿parental￿ discrimination. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is growing concern about the erosion of women￿s land rights in customary 
land areas, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.  A number of recent studies report that 
rising population pressure and increasing profitability of investment in land 
improvement, including commercial tree planting, have stimulated the evolution of 
customary land tenure institutions from communal ownership toward individualized 
ownership (Otsuka et al. 2001; Place and Otsuka 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Quisumbing et al. 
2001).  According to a recent literature review by Gray and Kevane (1999), increasing 
commercialization, population growth, and concurrent increases in land value seem to 
have adversely affected women￿s land rights in Africa.  It has been also argued that a 
shift in land tenure toward individualized rights has eroded women￿s land rights 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997).  This argument is often supported by noting the gradual 
disappearance of matrilineal inheritance and its replacement with patrilineal inheritance 
systems, e.g., in some parts of South Asia (Agarwal 1994) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Place 
and Otsuka 2001a, 2001b). 
However, empirical evidence supporting such popular arguments is generally 
scanty.  Moreover, whether changes in land inheritance patterns favoring men necessarily 
lead to a deterioration in women￿s welfare cannot be ascertained without considering 
other important forms of intergenerational wealth transfers.  For example, in economies 
with rapidly expanding nonfarm employment opportunities and low or stagnating returns 
to agriculture, education may be a more valuable form of wealth transfer to one￿s 
children than agricultural land.  In fact, recent studies in the Philippines by Estudillo, 
Quisumbing, and Otsuka (2001a, 2001b) found that daughters inherit less land but 
receive more schooling than sons, which leads to rough parity in total lifetime income. 
This study attempts to explore evolutionary changes in education and land 
inheritance patterns over three successive generations in Ghana￿s Western Region.
1  
Traditionally, Akan households in this region have practiced uterine inheritance, in which 
                                                 
1 This study is the basis for Chapter 9 in Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka (2004). 2 
land is transferred from the deceased man to his uterine brother or nephew (sister￿s son) 
in accordance with the decision of the extended family or matriclan.
2  In this system, 
children do not inherit land from their parents, particularly their fathers, but sons may 
inherit land from their matrilineal relatives.  In contrast, among patrilineal groups that 
have migrated to the area, inheritance occurs strictly along paternal lines.  Recently, 
however, Akan land is often transferred from husband to wife and children as inter-vivos 
gifts￿if the wife and children help the husband establish cocoa fields (Quisumbing et al. 
2001).  The increase in the demand for women￿s labor due to the expansion of labor-
intensive cocoa cultivation seems to have created incentives for husbands to give their 
wives and children land.  In this study, we expected that investments in the education of 
sons and daughters would adjust to changes in land inheritance practices, insofar as land 
transfers and education are major alternative forms of intergenerational wealth transfers. 
Using a specially designed retrospective household survey of land inheritance, 
gifts, temporary allocation of family land, and schooling over three generations, this 
paper explores statistically the determinants of the bestowal of land and investment in 
schooling between sons and daughters during the shift from communal to individualized 
tenure institutions.  We pay particular attention to different types of land transfers, since 
the strength of individual land rights is linked closely to the mode of land transfers:  gift 
transfers have the strongest individual rights and allocated family land the weakest. We 
also pay special attention to ￿social￿ discrimination (associated with traditional 
inheritance practices and land allocation rules among ethnic groups) and ￿parental￿ 
discrimination (expressed in differential treatment of daughters and sons associated with 
parental resource ownership).  We find that while daughters receive less land than sons, 
the bias against daughters in land transfers has weakened among Akans due to declining 
social discrimination.  This has occurred partly because of the adoption of an agricultural 
technology (cocoa farming) that increased demand for female labor and hence of 
                                                 
2 The preferred order of inheritance if a man dies intestate is first, his uterine brother; second, if there is no 
uterine brother, the son of a uterine sister; third, one of the sons of the deceased mother￿s sister (Awusabo-
Asare 1990). 3 
women￿s economic value and bargaining power.  Individualization of tenure was, in part, 
a means of providing an incentive to invest in land, particularly by women. Another 
important finding is that although daughters continue to be disadvantaged in schooling 
attainment, there are signs that the gender gap is beginning to close for the younger 
generation. 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
A Theory of Intergenerational Transfers
3 
In the wealth model of transfers, parents are often assumed to be altruistic (Becker 
1974; Becker and Tomes 1986) and care about their children￿s future income as well as 
their own consumption.  Parents collectively maximize a utility function spanning 
generations, in which utility depends on consumption of parents (C) and the expected 
future incomes of the daughter (Yd) and son (Ys), which enter separately into the utility 
function (Up): 
  Up = Up (C, Yd, Ys) .  (1) 
In this study, we assume that some forms of wealth are transmitted intergenerationally by 
parents, while others are inherited from clan relatives, usually matrikin.  We also assume 
that parents have one daughter and one son.  In a more general model, the number of 
children would be a choice variable. 
An income-generating function for the i-th child is defined as 
  Yi = F (Ei, fi, gi) + G (Ei, Ai, gi) + ui ,   i = d, s ,  (2) 
where F and G are production functions of food crops and cocoa, respectively; fi and Ai 
are allocated land for temporary food crop cultivation and gift or inherited land for 
agroforestry or cocoa cultivation, respectively; Ei is the education level represented by 
                                                 
3 This discussion draws partly on Quisumbing (1994). 4 
schooling; gi is the gender of the child; i indexes the daughter and son; and ui is a 
stochastic component with mean zero and variance σi
2.  In this specification, child￿s 
income is the sum of incomes from food crop and cocoa farming.
4 
In Ghana, land allocation for food crop farming is usually made by the extended 
family, while cocoa land is transferred as gifts by parents.  We associate allocated land 
with food crop production, because land rights on allocated land are weak, and use rights 
are preserved only if the land is farmed continuously.  In contrast, land with stronger 
rights is associated with permanent crops, although the direction of causation is not 
merely from stronger land rights to more permanent investment in land (Besley 1995).  
Tree planting may, in fact, be undertaken precisely to strengthen land rights (Quisumbing 
et al. 2001).
5 
The income constraint for parents is  
  Yp = C + pE Σ Ei + pA Σ Ai ,  (3) 
where the income of parents Yp is spent on parental consumption of goods C (the 
numeraire), and expenditures on education (peΣEi) and asset transfers (pAΣAi), in which 
the price of education is pe and the price of the cocoa area is pA.  It is assumed that unit 
cost of a transfer is the same for each child.  In most altruistic models, a parent 
maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3) to obtain the optimal investments in human capital 
and asset transfers to the daughter and son. 
In equation (3), it is assumed that parents are not concerned with the price of food 
crop area since its allocation is the purview of the extended family.  In practice, a young 
farmer may clear forestland to establish a farm or request an allocation of land from the 
extended family.  In either case, permission beyond one￿s own parents is needed￿from 
the village chief in the case of forest clearance, or the extended family for the use of 
family land (Quisumbing et al. 2001).  If the daughter were particularly efficient in 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we do not consider other farm and nonfarm income. 
5 In an expanded model, the effort of wives and children to establish cocoa farms, which promotes 
conversion of food cropland and confers strong individual rights, should be taken into account. 5 
generating income from food crops, the extended family could allocate land for food 
crops to her but decide not to give her cocoa land.  Conversely, if the son has a 
comparative advantage in agroforestry or cocoa growing (due to the requirement of 
greater physical strength to clear forest and bushland), the extended family might not 
allocate a large food crop area to him but bequeath more cocoa land to him.  Actual land 
transfers to the daughter and son from parents would then be unequal, depending on their 
comparative advantages and prior allocations from the extended family. 
Suppose now that the relative prices of land and education change.  Even if the 
comparative advantage of each child remained the same, such changes will result in a 
new utility-maximizing equilibrium, leading parents to change the equilibrium allocation 
of the two types of land and education.  Alternatively, if new technologies or crops are 
introduced, the comparative advantage of each child in generating income from different 
types of land or education would change.  For example, if the introduction of cocoa 
increases the demand for female labor, parents may reallocate land to daughters, even if 
they do not traditionally inherit land. 
As formulated above, the total amount of land transferred to children would result 
from decisions made by the extended family and parents. However, it is empirically 
difficult to analyze the determinants of land allocated by an extended family that may be 
composed of over 50 members. Thus this paper focuses primarily on parental wealth 
transfers. 
Conditional on transfers by the extended family, parents may have different 
objectives that motivate transfers to children.  Decisions may be based on future returns 
that the children would bring to them (Rosenzweig 1986), preferences for intersibling 
equality (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982), or trade-offs between equity and 
efficiency (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan 1990).  The parental allocation rules may be 
modified by disagreement between parents or by nonaltruistic transfer motives. If parents 
disagree, or if they do not pool their incomes, the common preference model with a 
single parental utility function specified above does not hold, and the outcome of the 
allocation is the result of bargaining between parents (e.g., McElroy 1990).  Like other 6 
household allocation outcomes (see Thomas 1990, 1994), intergenerational transfers may 
reflect individual preferences of husband and wife in decisionmaking, and thus the 
differential bargaining power of parents may influence the allocation of land and 
education to children.  A collective model of the household that does not assume that 
parents share the same preferences may be especially relevant to Ghana, where husbands 
and wives do not pool their resources and maintain ￿separate purses￿ (Doss 1996). 
Empirical Specification 
Suppose that parents contemplate transfer of different types of land and 
investment in human capital (or education, represented by schooling) to their children.  
To investigate the determinants of schooling and land transfers among sons and 
daughters, we estimate the following transfer equation: 
  T
*
ij = β0 + β1D + β2Xcij + β3Xfj + β4Xmj + γ1DXfj + γ2DXmj + εij ,  (4) 
where T
*




















ij are levels of schooling and areas of inherited, gift, and allocated 
land received by child i in family j.  Regression parameters βk and γm are vectors of 
coefficients for each type of transfer; D is the daughter dummy; Xc is a vector of child-
specific characteristics such as birth year, number of brothers, number of sisters, a 
dummy for a half-sibling, and dummies for the eldest child; Xf and Xm are vectors of 
exogenous human and physical wealth of father and mother at the time of marriage (years 
of schooling and land), respectively; DXfj and DXmj are interaction terms between the 
daughter dummy and father￿s and mother￿s exogenous human and physical capital; and 
εij is the error term in each equation. 
We distinguish among inherited, gift, and temporarily allocated family land, 
partly because individual land rights for each type differ substantially, and partly because 7 
the influence of parents on each type of land transfer is likely to be different.  Allocated 
land is usually fallow land controlled by the extended family, whereas inherited land was 
obtained from a deceased family member.  Thus, how much land is transferred is 
determined primarily by the decision of the extended family in accordance with 
traditional rules of land inheritance and allocation.  Such traditional rules have been 
circumvented by gifts from living donors to reward the efforts of wife and children to 
establish cocoa fields.  Gift transfers are also made among extended family members, and 
extended family members (who have shared interests in the same piece of land) need to 
approve gift transfers.  Once the wife or children receive the gift land, however, they can 
bequeath it to heirs of their choice.  Thus, if there is any ￿social￿ discrimination against 
female children by the extended family, we would expect to observe that daughters 
receive less family land that is not directly correlated with land owned by their father and 
mother.  This implies that the daughter dummy would have negative coefficients in the 
land transfer regressions.  By planting trees, parents can transfer their cultivated land 
directly to their children at will.  Therefore, if there is any parental discrimination against 
female children, we would expect to observe that interaction terms between parental 
landownership and the daughter dummy would have negative coefficients.  We are also 
interested in the significance of the total effect￿the sum of the social and parental 
discrimination effects against female children. 
In the case of schooling investments, it is not the extended family but parents who 
are decisionmakers.  Thus, the concept of social discrimination applied to land transfers 
is not relevant.  Yet, if returns to schooling are lower for women than for men due to 
societal discrimination in farm and nonfarm jobs, this effect will be captured by the 
daughter dummy.  Parental discrimination associated with resource ownership will be 
captured by the interaction terms between the daughter dummy and landownership or 
schooling, to the extent that land and schooling accurately reflect the physical and human 
wealth of parents. 
To account for the possibility that husband and wife do not have identical 
preferences regarding bestowals to children, an empirical specification consistent with a 8 
collective model of the household is used.
6  Thus, father￿s and mother￿s wealth at the 
time of marriage, which are exogenous to decisions made within marriage, enter 
separately into the regressions.  Parental wealth consists of human capital, as proxied by 
years of schooling, and each parent￿s holdings of land at the time of marriage.  Most land 
held at the time of marriage is either recently cleared forestland or food cropland 
allocated by the extended family.  We do not distinguish between each type of parental 
land in this analysis.  If the coefficients of the same physical or human capital variables 
for father and mother differ significantly, the unitary model of household decisionmaking 
is rejected. 
We also include the number of brothers and sisters in the regression to test 
whether sibling rivalry affects the allocation of land and schooling to children (Butcher 
and Case 1994; Garg and Morduch 1998a, 1998b; Morduch 2000).  Like parental land 
assets, schooling is interacted with the daughter dummy to test whether parents with more 
human capital treat children of different sexes differentially.
7  If the interaction terms 
with parental characteristics differ significantly, the unitary model is also rejected. 
A final test of the unitary model involves comparing the sum of the coefficient on 
the parental wealth variable and the coefficient of its relevant interaction term with child 
gender with the corresponding sum for the opposite-sex parent.  This comparison 
captures the total effect of the parental characteristic￿not the partial effect achieved by 
simply comparing the coefficients on the wealth variables.  If the sums are significantly 
different, this is inconsistent with the unitary model. 
Equation (4) is estimated both in levels and with family fixed effects.  Since land 
transfers are subject to censoring (many children do not receive any land), a tobit 
procedure is used for the land regressions in levels.  However, it is possible that omitted 
                                                 
6 For a review of collective models of the household, see Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997).  This 
formulation draws from McElroy￿s (1990) specification of the Nash bargaining model and is similar to 
Thomas (1990, 1994). 
7 For example, Thomas (1990, 1994) finds that maternal education and nonlabor income have a bigger 
impact on the height of a daughter, relative to a son, and that paternal education has a bigger impact on a 
son, relative to a daughter. 9 
family-level variables, such as the total land area controlled by the extended family, are 
correlated with regressors, and thus their estimated effects on transfers may be biased.  
For those families with at least two children, the within-family allocation can be used as 
the source of variation in the sample from which to estimate intrahousehold differences in 
transfers.
8  A fixed-effects estimation procedure could control for these unobservables 
using family-specific dummy variables.
9  In this specific application, however, only the 
child￿s sex, year of birth, half-sibling and eldest dummies, interaction between child sex 
and ethnic group, and interaction between child sex and parent characteristics remain as 
explanatory variables.  That is, the effects of variables that do not vary across children 
cannot be identified.  Because tobit is inconsistent in the presence of fixed effects, we use 
the HonorØ (1992) least-absolute deviations tobit estimator, which is both consistent and 
asymptotically normal under suitable regularity conditions and assumes neither a 
particular parametric form nor homoskedasticity. 
3.  Inheritance and Schooling in Ghana￿s Western Region 
Study Sites and Sample Description 
We conducted a survey of households in 1996￿97 in 10 selected villages in the 
Wassa area of Ghana￿s Western Region.  Although Wassa is the last frontier of westward 
movement of the cocoa area in this country as migrants moved in search of cultivable 
forestland (Hill 1963), with the exception of reserve areas, virgin forests have already 
disappeared in our study sites.  After conducting a census of 1,878 households in the 10 
villages, we chose 281 households, based on stratified random sampling of pure owners, 
pure tenants, pure caretakers (who manage mature cocoa fields, usually for absentee 
owners), owners cum tenants, owners cum caretakers, and tenants cum caretakers 
                                                 
8 Families with at least two children are included so that birth order and sex dummies are relevant in the 
family fixed-effects specification.  The fixed-effects procedure eliminates selectivity bias since family size, 
which affects selection into the sample, is a family-specific variable (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990). 
9 That is, the observed transfer, Tij, to child i in family j would be given by Tij = tj + βXij + uij, where the 
family-specific effect is a dummy variable, tj, which is taken to be constant for a family (Hsiao 1986). 10 
households.
10  Sample sizes were allocated to the 10 villages in proportion to village 
population. 
For each sample household, we collected information on land tenure status and 
land use of all parcels, which are defined as contiguous areas of land acquired at the same 
time through a single mode of acquisition.  To investigate whether broad changes in land 
tenure patterns in the process of individualization have affected the distribution of land 
rights by gender, a retrospective survey of inheritance and schooling was administered to 
all households.  The retrospective survey on inheritance was patterned after similar 
surveys in the Philippines (Quisumbing 1994; Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001a, 
2001b) and Sumatra (Quisumbing and Otsuka 2001), and included questions on the 
parents, siblings, and children of the respondents, yielding information on three 
generations called the parents￿, respondents￿, and children￿s generations.
11  The 
respondents were asked about premarriage wealth (schooling and landownership) of their 
parents and in-laws (and other familial sources of inheritance), the schooling and 
inheritance of their spouses, and schooling and proposed bequests to their children.  Each 
respondent was also asked to list all of his or her siblings, their dates of birth, their 
educational attainment, and the areas of different types of land that they received or 
expected to receive from their parents or other relatives.  In many cases, respondents 
received land at marriage, but stood to inherit more land after their parents￿ death. 
Since one can inherit land from the matriclan as well as from one￿s own parents, 
inheritance was distinguished according to its source.  Unlike other sites where we 
conducted similar surveys, the survey in Ghana was administered only to the head of 
household (usually male), since low levels of literacy among wives made it difficult for 
                                                 
10 A total of 281 households were interviewed, but 23 were dropped for various reasons (including 
noncompletion of questionnaires for all three rounds).  This brings the total to 258 households.  The 
household tenure status can only be created for 257 households, since the tenure variable for some fields is 
missing in one household.  Our subsequent discussion refers to 197 intact households (with both spouses 
present) with complete information for three generations.  Unless otherwise specified, the discussion refers 
to this subsample. 
11 The grandchild generation is called the child generation for brevity. 11 
them to answer questions that involved retrospective or recall information such as dates 
or years of birth. 
An interesting feature of the Ghana survey is the complexity of inheritance 
sources and potential heirs, due to the uterine matrilineal system and the practice of 
polygyny.  Under the matrilineal system, a person can inherit from a number of 
matrilineal relatives, depending on the order of succession.  Due to polygyny and the 
practice of serial marriage, an individual may have several sets of maternal and paternal 
half-siblings. 
Based on the above considerations, and after extensive pretests in the field, the 
inheritance retrospective was designed to capture the possibility of acquiring land from 
four sets of matrilineal relatives:  the mother, maternal uncle, maternal grandmother, and 
other matrilineal relatives.  Only one source of paternal inheritance was identified:  the 
father.  Respondents (heads of households) were also asked to list all their paternal and 
maternal full- and half-siblings.  Interestingly enough, individuals were often uncertain 
how many half-siblings they had, particularly if one of their parents had moved to 
another village upon remarriage.  Since not only siblings but also cousins, nieces, and 
nephews can inherit land from the matriclan, the number of heirs can potentially be very 
large. To simplify matters, the analysis is confined only to the siblings and half-siblings 
the respondent could name, and thus parental landholdings are not divided by the number 
of potential heirs to capture the effects of population pressure. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics regarding the schooling of the parent, 
respondent, and child generations.  Only households for which parental information is 
complete are included in the analysis; for the respondent generation, only children who 
survived to 21 years are included in the regressions.  The age cutoff ensures that 
schooling decisions will have been completed in the respondent generation, although in 
practice children leave school much earlier.  The general level of schooling in the 
parents￿ generation is low￿84 percent of fathers have never been to school, compared to 
94 percent of mothers￿and fathers have more years of schooling than mothers.  Among 
Akan households, fathers had 1.6 years compared to 0.3 years for mothers; among non-12 
Akans, fathers had 1.1 years and mothers 0.4 years.  Schooling attainment has increased 
in the respondents￿ generation, but it is still low.  The mean completed years of schooling 
for husbands in Akan areas is 7.2, while that of wives is 3.8; completed schooling is 
lower among non-Akans￿4.6 years for husbands and 2.5 years for wives.  The gender 
gap, however, seems to have narrowed in the respondent generation, reflecting the 
tendency for women￿s schooling levels to increase through time as public educational 
systems expand into more remote areas.  The gap between males and females is much 
narrower in the child generation￿it is larger for older children of the household head and 
smaller among the younger children.  For example, among Akans, differences in 
schooling between male and female children are 1.7 years for those older than 21, 1.2 
years for those between 13 and 21 years, and only 1.0 year for those between 7 and 21. 
Table 1￿Demographic characteristics of sample individuals, by ethnic group of individual, 
Ghana 
  Akan  Non-Akan 
   Year of birth  Years of schooling   Year of birth  Years of schooling
  N Mean 
Standard 




deviation  Mean 
Standard 
deviation
Parents of head and 
resident  spouses                   
  Father  301  n.a.    1.6  3.5  86  n.a.    1.1  3.1 
  Mother  315  n.a.    0.3  1.5  74  n.a.    0.4  1.8 
Respondents and 
spouses                    
  Male  147  1951  14.3  7.2  4.3  38  1948  14.0  4.6  5.2 
  Female  153  1958  12.0  3.8  5.0  38  1957  11.3  2.5  3.7 
Older children
a                    
  Male  41  1967  6.7  8.6  4.9  14  1967  4.5  7.6  5.9 
  Female  35  1965  8.1  6.9  5.0 19  1965  6.1  7.1  4.6 
Younger children
b                    
  Male  58  1979  2.6  7.6  2.9  14  1978  3.6  6.9  3.7 
  Female  58  1980  2.4  6.4  3.2 19  1979  2.2  6.5  3.5 
School-age 
children
c                    
  Male  121  1982  6.9  5.3  3.6  21  1981  5.1  5.1  4.1 
  Female  141  1983  4.0  4.3  3.1 27  1981  4.2  5.5  3.4 
Notes:  The table is based on the subsample of 197 intact households with information for all three generations.  
n.a. = not available. 
a Children above 21 years. 
b Children from 13 to 21 years. 
c Children from 7 to 21 years of age. 13 
Table 2 presents information on land owned by each generation.  At the time of 
marriage or independent farming, Akan fathers had 8.3 hectares of land; mothers had 
only 1.6 hectares.  Non-Akan fathers had 5.1 hectares, while mothers had 0.6.  This is 
consistent with our previous analysis of household patterns of land acquisition 
(Quisumbing et al. 2001):  men typically start farming independently by clearing forests, 
whereas women heads of household are less likely to acquire forestland.  Non-Akans, 
who are migrants to the study area, do not have access to family land.  In the 
respondents￿ generation, land sizes at the time of marriage had declined markedly for 
both males and females, and proposed sizes of land to be bestowed to children had 
likewise declined, but not by as much as the decline between the parents￿ and 
respondents￿ generation.  However, it is interesting to note that disparities in landholding 
sizes between fathers and mothers are growing smaller, especially for Akan households.  
While fathers had five to nine times as much land as mothers in the parent generation, 
husbands had only twice as much land as their wives.  In the child generation, Akan sons 
would stand to inherit about 40 percent more than their sisters, even though non-Akan 
sons would continue to inherit more than twice the land of their sisters.  Thus, it seems 
clear that gender gaps in both land and schooling are narrowing through time, particularly 
among Akans. 
Table 2￿Land owned, by ethnic group of individual, in hectares 
  Akan    Non-Akan 
  N Mean Standard  deviation    N Mean Standard  deviation 
Respondents￿ parents generation
a             
  Males  209 8.3  10.7    60  5.1  6.7 
  Females  282 1.6  3.4    66  0.6  1.8 
Respondents￿ generation
b              
  Males  725 2.3  5.2    197  1.0  2.3 
  Females  579 0.9  1.7    135  0.6  0.8 
Respondents￿ children￿s generation
c             
  Males  169 1.3  1.9    36  1.5  2.1 
  Females  176 0.9  1.8    47  0.7  0.7 
Note:  The table is based on the subsample of 197 intact households with information for all three generations. 
a Size of landholdings at the time of their marriage or independence from family. 
b Land received from family in the form of inheritance, allocation, or gift.  The sample consists of respondents and their 
siblings who were either living at the time of the survey or deceased but age 21 or over at the time of death. 
c Includes land jointly given by father and mother.  Living children age 7 or over only, children of intact couples only. 14 
Although the land transfer questionnaire distinguished among four sources of 
matrilineal inheritance, in practice there were very few observations in each of the 
separate categories, so the analysis aggregated all the matrilineal categories.
12  The 
distribution of land received by mode of transfer￿inheritance, allocation, and gift￿from 
both maternal and paternal kin is presented in Table 3.  The importance of each type of 
land transfer differs across Akans and non-Akans.  For both Akan males and females, 
inheritance and gifts are the most important means of land transfer, with inherited land 
Table 3￿Average size of land per person (in hectares) received from family by respondent 
and siblings in the form of inheritance, allocation, or gift, by ethnic group of 
head (includes only those currently living or deceased but were age 21 or over at 
time of death) 
  Akan head  Non-Akan head 
  Inherited Allocated Gift Total Inherited Allocated Gift Total
Males in respondents￿ generation                 
  From mother and matrikin                 
    Mean  .71  .11  .38  1.20  .18  .02  .06  .25 
    Standard deviation  3.64  .65  1.45 4.00  1.01  0.30  .41  1.12 
    N  725  725  725  725  197  197  197  197 
  From father                 
    Mean  .57  .07  .47  1.11  .59  .02  .13  .73 
    Standard deviation  1.91  .82  1.97 2.99  1.68  .13  .86  1.86 
    N  725  725  725  725  197  197  197  197 
  Total                 
    Mean  1.28  .18  .85  2.31  .76  .04  .18  .98 
    Standard deviation  4.27  1.04  2.51 5.17  2.06  .33  1.00  2.26 
    N  725  725  725  725  197  197  197  197 
Females in respondent￿s generation                 
  From mother and matrikin                 
    Mean  .11  .05  .13  .30  .12  0  0  .12 
    Standard deviation  0.55  .57  0.73 1.27  .36  0  0  .36 
    N  579  579  579  579  131  131  131  131 
  From father                 
    Mean  .36  .02  .20  .59  .43  0  0  .43 
    Standard deviation  0.91  .16  .62  1.05  .57  0  0  .57 
    N  579  579  579  579  131  131  131  131 
  Total                 
    Mean  .48  .07  .33  0.88  .55  0  0  .55 
    Standard deviation  1.11  .59  0.98 1.66  0.80  0  0  .80 
    N  579  579  579  579  131  131  131  131 
 
                                                 
12 Distinguishing among the different sources of matrilineal inheritance greatly improved survey response.  
However, since it was easier for respondents to identify a piece of land as coming from a specific relative, 
say a maternal uncle, than from a larger category called the matriclan. 15 
areas slightly larger than those received as gifts.  Inheritance is the most important form 
of land transfer for non-Akans.  While gift transfers exist, they are not as important as a 
means of transferring wealth directly to one￿s children as they are among Akans, for 
whom gifts are a means of subverting the matrilineal inheritance system.  Taking all land 
categories together, males receive more land than females. 
Finally, we examine the transfer or bestowal intentions of respondents in Table 4.  
Regardless of ethnicity, most land to be bestowed to children comes from the father, as 
mothers bring less land to the marriage.  While mothers￿ land tends to be more equally 
divided between sons and daughters, fathers tend to bestow their land preferentially to 
sons. 
Table 4￿Mean size of land (hectares) to be bestowed
a to children 7 years old or older, by 
ethnic group of parent (includes only children from intact households) 
  Akan    Non-Akan 
  Father Mother    Father Mother 
Son        
  Mean  1.12  0.10    1.45  0.21 
  Standard deviation  1.80  0.30    1.80  0.35 
  N  159  169    47  36 
Daughter        
  Mean  0.77  0.10    0.80  0.20 
  Standard deviation  0.74  0.22    0.90  0.30 
  N  157  176    66  47 
a Includes land already bestowed.  The proportion of children to which some land is already bestowed is 
4 percent. 
Determinants of Wealth Transfers in the Respondent Generation 
Table 5 presents tobit regression results on the determinants of land transfers and 
years of schooling for the respondent and his or her siblings.  We analyze four categories 
of land transfers:  ￿permanent￿ transfers (the sum of inherited and gift land), inherited 
land, gift land, and ￿temporary￿ transfers or allocated land.  Allocated land is allocated 
by the extended family to the individual for temporary use, and thus land rights are 
weaker than those for inherited and gift land (Quisumbing et al. 2001).  Technically, 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































land rights can be strengthened on such land through tree planting.  We include it in the 
discussion to illustrate the contrast in transfer patterns between land with strong and weak 
land rights. 
The daughter dummy is negative and significant in the gift and allocated land 
regressions.  Although it may seem that daughters may claim use rights on food crop 
fields through allocation from their matrilineal families, this method of transfer is biased 
￿socially￿ against women.  Thus, regardless of land use type, women are disadvantaged 
in land transfer.  The non-Akan dummy is negative and significant in the permanent land 
transfer equation.  This reflects the greater difficulty of access to land by non-Akans, who 
tend to be migrants to the area.  The interaction term between the daughter and non-Akan 
dummies is insignificant, suggesting the absence of stronger social discrimination against 
women in non-Akan communities.
13  As expected, half-siblings appear disadvantaged in 
land receipts.  Interestingly, the number of brothers exerts a negative influence on all land 
received, while the number of sisters has a positive effect on total land and on allocated 
land.  This suggests that brothers, rather than sisters, compete for the family￿s land 
resources, consistent with other findings for Ghana on sibling rivalry (Garg and Morduch 
1998a, 1998b).  Larger sizes of land owned by the father are positively associated with 
larger receipts of all land and inherited land by children.  Judging from negative and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term between the daughter dummy and father￿s 
land in the inheritance regression, as well as in the total permanent land transfer 
regression, sons seem to be favored by their father when he owns more land. 
We pay special attention to the gift equation, since this can be considered as an 
institutional innovation that makes it possible to transfer land to desired heirs.  Gift 
transfers are less common among non-Akans, since there is no incentive to use inter-
vivos transfers to prevent one￿s wealth from being absorbed by the matriclan at the 
expense of one￿s own children.  Gifts also seem to have become more prevalent over 
                                                 
13 The interaction term between the daughter dummy and the non-Akan dummy was not included in the gift 
land regression due to nonconvergence.  Upon examination of the data, we found that the incidence of gift 
transfers among non-Akans was so low that there were hardly any significant variations. 18 
time, as indicated by the positive coefficient on birth year, which outweighs the negative 
effect of its squared term.  Father￿s land is positively associated with gift transfers, 
whereas mother￿s land has a negative effect, possibly because the matriclan still has 
claims on her land.  It is worth emphasizing that the interaction terms between the 
daughter dummy and parental landownership are insignificant, which indicates the 
absence of parental discrimination against daughters with respect to gift transfers. 
Gender disparities are more obvious in the schooling equation, where the daughter 
dummy is negative and highly significant.  It is clear that daughters are subject to social 
discrimination in both land transfers and schooling investments.  Schooling attainment 
does improve through time at a decelerating rate, as shown by the coefficients on birth 
year and its square.  Both father￿s land and schooling exert a positive influence on child 
schooling completion, while mother￿s schooling does not have any effect.  This is 
probably due to the extremely low levels of schooling among women of this generation.  
The number of sisters has a positive and significant effect on own schooling attainment, a 
result consistent with those of Garg and Morduch (1998b) for Ghana.
14  To the extent that 
parental landownership and schooling represent parental wealth, the absence of the 
significant effects of the interaction terms between the daughter dummy and parental land 
or schooling indicates the absence of parental discrimination associated with their wealth. 
F-tests on coefficients suggest that the effects of paternal and maternal schooling 
are significantly different from each other in the inheritance and schooling equations, and 
that the coefficients of parental land also differ in the total land and inheritance equations.  
This leads us to reject the unitary model of household behavior in Ghana, consistent with 
findings of Doss (1996). 
Because the estimates in Table 5 do not take into account possible effects of 
family-level unobservables that may affect the allocation of land and schooling across 
                                                 
14 Garg and Morduch (1998a) find predicted improvements of as high as 40 percent in anthropometric 
measures of children in Ghana when shifting from a scenario where all siblings are brothers to one in which 
all are sisters.  Garg and Morduch (1998b) also find that predicted enrollments in secondary school are 
increased by more than 50 percent when sifting from an all-brothers to all-sisters scenario, but they find 
negligible impacts on primary school enrollments. 19 
siblings, we present family fixed-effects estimates in Table 6.  The estimation sample for 
each equation is confined to those families that report making the particular type of land 
transfer to at least one child or sending at least one child to school.  The results shown in 
Tables 5￿6 are largely consistent.  For example, even if family-level unobservables are 
controlled for, we still observe that daughters do worse in permanent land transfer only 
with respect to gifts.  Half-siblings also fare worse generally with respect to permanent 
land transfers.  However, none of the coefficients in the allocated land equation are 
significant in Table 6, perhaps because land allocation decisions are not made by 
biological parents but by the extended family.
15  Moreover, slightly stronger indications 
of parental preferences emerge in the inherited land equation.  Mothers with more land 
and schooling seem to favor daughters.  This type of land transfer is possible because 
land owned by mothers is often land they have received as a gift, and for which they have 
strong transfer rights.  Fathers with more land favor sons, consistent with other studies on 
parental gender preference (Thomas 1994).
16  These results provide additional evidence 
against the unitary model of the household.  While discrimination against daughters in 
land transfers does not seem pervasive, they are clearly disadvantaged with respect to 
schooling attainment.  We return to an analysis of changes in total gender discrimination 
later. 
Determinants of Schooling and Proposed Land Transfers in the Child 
Generation 
We now examine potential bequest and schooling decisions of the respondent and 
his wife.  Table 7 shows tobit estimates of the determinants of expected land transfer to 
the respondent￿s children, disaggregated by source.  This type of land transfer 
                                                 
15 Since all children within the same household belong to the same extended family, ￿extended family 
unobservables￿ would also be controlled for using the family fixed-effects procedure.  This may explain 
why the daughter dummy is negative in the levels regressions for allocated land, but not the fixed effects 
regressions. 
16 Thomas (1994) finds that in three countries, the United States, Brazil, and Ghana, the education level of 
the mother has a larger effect on daughter￿s height, and the education of the father has a larger effect on 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































corresponds loosely to the ￿permanent￿ land transfer category in the previous generation, 
since respondents no longer distinguished between ￿inheritance￿ and ￿gifts￿ in their plans 
to transfer land to their children.  We did not include, however, land transfers from 
relatives.  Thus, social discrimination is expected to appear, to the extent that parental 
land will be transferred to other members of the extended family.  The sample is 
restricted to children of the respondents who are 7 and older, and who are alive at the 
time of the survey. 
Table 7￿Determinants of expected land transfers and schooling, respondent￿s children, 
tobit estimates 
Living children age 7 years and above; village dummies included but coefficients not reported. 
 
  Levels estimates 
  Land from husband Land from wife 
Land from both 
parents    Years of schooling 




statistic Coefficient t-statistic    Coefficient 
t-
statistic
Daughter dummy  -0.327  -1.70  -0.067  -0.37  -0.466  -2.46   -2.130  -3.48 
Non-Akan dummy  0.353  1.58  -0.334  -1.59  -0.149  -0.80    -0.538  -0.73 
Daughter × non-Akan  -0.824  -3.04  0.267 1.11       -0.066  -0.07 
Age 0.007  0.27  0.025  1.17  0.018  0.65    0.801  9.79 
Age squared  0.000  0.77  0.000  -0.91  0.000  0.33    -0.013  -7.84 
Number of brothers  -0.055  -1.54  -0.083  -2.72  -0.110  -2.86   0.076  0.65 
Number of sisters  -0.023  -0.74  0.008  0.28  -0.016  -0.48    -0.092  -0.91 
Father￿s schooling  -0.060  -3.44  -0.001 -0.08  -0.076 -4.00   -0.030  -0.54 
Mother￿s schooling  -0.004  -0.19  0.000  0.03  -0.002  -0.11    -0.028  -0.45 
Father￿s land  0.016  2.64  0.007 0.83  0.017 2.57   0.025  1.24 
Mother￿s land  -0.001  -0.03  0.026  0.95  0.006  0.16    0.049  0.41 
Daughter × father￿s schooling  0.050  2.10  0.013 0.63  0.061 2.39   0.102  1.34 
Daughter × mother￿s schooling  -0.029  -1.07  0.013  0.60  -0.025  -0.86    0.087  1.01 
Daughter × father￿s land  -0.006  -0.75  0.000  0.02  -0.005  -0.59    -0.006  -0.23 
Daughter × mother￿s land  0.092  2.0  0.005 0.16  0.062 1.33    -0.144  -0.96 
Constant 0.738  2.24  -0.263 -0.95  1.083  3.02   -3.348  -3.12 
F-tests on coefficients (p-value)                   
Father￿s schooling = 
mother’ schooling  3.35  0.07  0.00  0.95  4.88  0.03   0.00  0.98 
Father￿s land = mother￿s land  0.21  0.65  0.34  0.56  0.07  0.79    0.04  0.85 
Daughter × father￿s schooling = 
daughter × mother￿s schooling  3.37  0.07  0.00  0.98  3.47  0.06    0.01  0.91 
Daughter × father￿s land = 
daughter × mother￿s land  4.31  0.04  0.02 0.90 1.79 0.18    0.73  0.39 
All education effects equal  0.50  0.48 0.01 0.93 0.14  0.71    0.02 0.90 
All land effects equal  5.70  0.02  0.51 0.48 2.36 0.13    0.96  0.33 
Number of observations  509    506    506      513   
Chi-square 175.02    57.2    150.34      216.86   
p-value 0.00    0.00    0      0.00   
Number of censored observations  92    373    63      54   
Number of uncensored 
observations 417    133    443      459   
Notes:  estimator used is HonorØ￿s least absolute deviations estimator.  T-statistics in bold are significant at 5 percent or better. 22 
It is found that daughters are clearly disadvantaged with respect to proposed 
bestowals of land from both parents.  Transfers to daughters from their fathers appear to 
be smaller in non-Akan households.  This is consistent with our contention that the 
evolution of the land tenure system among Akans favors wives and daughters.  The 
number of brothers has negative and significant coefficients, suggesting that brothers 
continue to compete for the family￿s land, while the number of sisters does not seem to 
have such an effect.  Unlike father￿s land, which has a positive and significant effect, 
father￿s schooling has a negative impact on land coming from the father, as well as on 
land from both parents (which is dominated by transfers from the father).  It is possible 
that fathers who are better educated prefer to bequeath other forms of wealth to their 
children, such as nonland assets or education.  It is also possible that better-educated 
fathers are in less land-intensive occupations.  The negative effect of being a daughter is 
partly counteracted by the positive effects of the interaction term with father￿s schooling 
and mother￿s land, although this result is not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects (see 
below).  It seems clear, however, that there is no significant parental discrimination 
against daughters among the children￿s generation. 
F-tests on coefficients show that the coefficients on parents￿ land and their 
interaction with the daughter dummy differ significantly from each other in the equation 
for land from the husband.  The coefficients of father￿s and mother￿s schooling also 
significantly differ from each other in the equation for land from both parents.  These 
results indicate that the unitary model of the household can be rejected as far as land 
bestowal decisions are concerned. 
To examine whether these results hold when family-level unobservables are 
considered, we reestimate the land and schooling equations with family fixed effects 
(Table 8).  The sample is restricted to families with at least two children who make a land 
transfer to at least one child, or, in the case of the schooling equation, in which at least 
one child has attended school.  This restriction reduces the number of observations in the 
estimation sample but is not subject to selection bias since selection into the sample is a 23 
family-specific variable.  Since there are very few families that report transfers of land 
from the wife, we were unable to estimate this equation with fixed effects. 
Table 8￿Determinants of expected land transfers and schooling, respondent￿s children, 
fixed effects tobit estimates 
Living children age 7 and above; families with at least two children; land bestowals estimated for families that 
reported bestowal plans for at least one child. 
  Land from husband  Land from both parents  Years of schooling 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic
Daughter dummy  0.014  0.88  0.010  0.60  -1.144  -2.06 
Daughter × non-Akan  -0.093  -1.70  -0.082  -1.92  -0.310  -0.43 
Age -0.001  -0.30  -0.001  -0.27  1.032  11.67 
Age squared  0.000  0.68  0.000  0.19  -0.018  -8.95 
Daughter￿s father￿s schooling  -0.003  -0.77  -0.004  -1.28  0.075  1.05 
Daughter￿s mother￿s schooling  0.001 0.27  0.005  1.40  0.043  0.66 
Daughter￿s father￿s land  0.000  0.12 0.000  -0.01 -0.012  -1.66 
Daughter￿s mother￿s land  0.005 1.43  0.004  1.51  0.026  0.48 
Number of observations  318    318    512   
Chi-square 10.70    9.10    5,637.40   
p-value 22.20    33.20    0.00   
Note:  t-statistics in bold are significant at 5 percent or better. 
 
 
The most striking result from the fixed-effects estimates is the insignificance of 
the interaction terms between the daughter dummy and parental wealth variables.  Such 
results support the hypothesis that parents are egalitarian with respect to the transfer of 
their own wealth.  The results also show that daughters within the Akan ethnic group are 
no longer subject to social discrimination in land transfers but still suffer with respect to 
schooling, suggesting that different social factors affect land transfers and schooling 
investments.  There is also indication that discrimination in land transfers against 
daughters persists in non-Akan families, although the coefficients are weakly significant. 
Finally, we turn to the determinants of schooling investments in children age 7 
and above exhibited in Tables 7￿8.  To take into account incomplete schooling decisions 
of younger children, we control for the correlation between age and school completion by 
including linear and quadratic terms in child age.  We deal with censoring in schooling 
attainment also by using a tobit estimator, since a non-negligible proportion of children 24 
has never attended school.
17  Levels estimates of schooling attainment point to gender 
disparities in schooling:  girls do worse than boys in terms of years of schooling.  This 
result is consistent with the fixed effects estimates (Table 8):  daughters consistently get 
fewer years of schooling than their brothers.  It is, however, important to emphasize that 
the coefficient of the daughter dummy is much smaller in the regression of the child 
generation than in the respondent￿s generation, indicating the declining gender gap in 
schooling over the two generations. 
Changing Patterns of Gender Discrimination 
To rigorously test whether patterns of overall gender discrimination have changed 
across generations, we examine changes in the total discrimination effect, which is the 
sum of social and parental discrimination.  We examine the sources of discrimination by 
differentiating equation (4) with respect to the daughter dummy, evaluating the 
interaction terms at the means for the parental resource variables, and testing whether the 
total effect is equal to zero.  Using the estimation results shown in Tables 5 and 7, we 
present the results separately for each type of transfer and for each generation in Table 9. 
In the respondent generation, there is significant bias against women in total land 
transfer among families of Akan ethnicity.  This is due importantly to the strong bias 
Table 9￿Tests for gender discrimination, respondent and child generation 
  Respondent generation 
  Inherited + gift    Inherited land    Gift    Schooling 
Total gender effects  F  p-value    F p-value    F p-value    F p-value 
For Akans  7.35  0.01    0.47  0.49    8.15  0.00    99.43  0.00 
For non-Akans  0.26  0.61    0.00  0.96    12.60  0.00    29.20  0.00 
  Child generation 
  Land from father    Land from mother    Land from both    Schooling 
  F p-value    F p-value    F p-value    F p-value 
For Akans  0.99  0.32    0.63  0.43    2.12  0.15    9.88  0.00 
For non-Akans  12.67  0.00    1.99  0.16   0.90  0.34    5.99  0.01 
Notes:  P-values in bold indicate significance at 5 percent or better.  Gender effects evaluated at means of respective 
ethnic groups for Akans and non-Akans.  Coefficients from levels regressions. 
                                                 
17 In this sample, 11 percent of children age 7 and older have never attended school. 25 
against women in gift transfers, which arises primarily from strong social discrimination 
(see Table 5).  In contrast, we found no significant discrimination in total land transfers 
among non-Akans, which may be partly explained by the relatively small sample size of 
non-Akans (see Table 1).  Note, however, that total land transfers are the sum of different 
forms of land transfers.  Significant social discrimination against females exists for both 
Akans and non-Akans, with stronger discrimination against non-Akan females as 
indicated by the size of the F-statistic. 
Strong gender bias is observed in schooling for both ethnic groups.  This can be 
attributed primarily to strong social discrimination against daughters, according to the 
estimation results in Table 5. 
In the generation of the respondent￿s children, it is remarkable to find no 
significant discrimination against females among Akans in land transfers, despite weakly 
significant effects of the daughter dummy in the land transfer regressions reported in 
Table 7.  However, we now clearly observe strong total discrimination among non-Akans 
with respect to total land transfer.  It may well be that social discrimination against 
women persists in non-Akan patrilineal communities, where men generally dominate not 
only landownership but also decisions about farming and household affairs.  Lastly, it 
must be pointed out that total discrimination against daughters persists in schooling for 
both Akans and non-Akans.  Yet, it is important to note that F-values are much smaller 
for the child generation than the respondent generation, which reflects the declining 
gender gap in schooling over time. 
4.  Conclusions 
It is often argued that women￿s land rights tend to decline as customary land 
tenure institutions evolve toward individualized ownership systems.  While it is true that 
evolutionary changes toward individual ownership have been taking place in Ghana￿s 
Western Region, women￿s land rights have been strengthened rather than weakened over 
time.  Gifts have recently emerged as an important way to transfer land from men to 26 
women, thereby reducing the social discrimination against women in land transfers.  It is 
important to recall that gifts are allowed by the extended family only if wives and 
children help the husband establish cocoa fields (which require a lot of female labor for 
weeding).  Thus, the increasing transfer of land to wives and daughters is consistent with 
the increasing demand for female labor as land use intensifies.  Such long-term changes 
have been supported by the absence of strong parental discrimination against daughters.  
It is important to note that such equity-improving changes in land transfers have been 
achieved without sacrificing farming efficiency.  Quisumbing et al. (2001) found no 
evidence of lower production efficiency on cocoa farms owned by female farmers. 
Gender differences in schooling have been also declining in Ghana￿s Western 
Region, primarily because of declining social discrimination.  Although we have not 
analyzed the social and economic forces underlying such changes, we conjecture that 
building schools in remote villages and increasing nonfarm employment opportunities for 
women have increased parental investments in daughters￿ schooling.  Moreover, as 
school enrollments approach universal, it is natural for the gender gap in schooling 
attainment to close.  More rigorous analysis has to be performed, however, to achieve a 
deeper understanding of the declining gender gap in schooling in Ghana￿s Western 
Region. 
Whether our results can be generalized is a major remaining empirical issue.  
First, this is a case in which an agricultural technology (cocoa farming) increased demand 
for female labor, and hence increased women￿s economic value and bargaining power.  
Individualization of tenure was in part a means of providing an incentive to invest in the 
land, particularly by women.  In other cases where women￿s labor was less important for 
cash cropping, individualization might still decrease women￿s control over land (as 
argued by other writers on women￿s land rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, e.g., Lastarria-
Cornhiel 1998). 
While our parallel studies in the Philippines and Indonesia (Estudillo, 
Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001a, 2001b; Quisumbing and Otsuka 2001) also find that 
parents are basically egalitarian with respect to land transfers and schooling investment, 27 
these studies were also conducted in bilateral or matrilineal societies, which have a 
generally egalitarian social structure.  It would be rash to conclude that this is the case in 
Ghana, however, where other studies using nationally representative data sets 
(Quisumbing et al. 2001) have found significantly higher poverty measures among 
women and female heads of households.  Moreover, all three cases that we have studied 
(including Ghana) have matrilineal or bilateral inheritance traditions￿a fact that may 
limit its generalizability.  The majority of cultures throughout the world practice 
patrilineal inheritance, and like the non-Akans in this study, discrimination against 
females is usually stronger.  Intergenerational transfers in patrilineal societies deserve 
further study. 
Regardless of parental transfer motives, a major policy effort should be made to 
remove or reduce social discrimination by providing fair access to schooling or 
promulgating egalitarian succession laws.  Further compilation of empirical knowledge, 
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